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FOR SCIOFF

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TGEN, UR, US

SUBJECT: SECOND DRAFT OF COVERING MEMO FOR NSC CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT

BEGIN TEXT:

1. THIS MEMORANDUM TRANSMITS THE CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ELEVEN US-USSR SPECIALIZED BILATERAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS SINCE THEIR INCEPTION, AND THE FOURTH QUARTER REPORT ON THE AGREEMENTS FOR OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1975. THE MEMORANDUM PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF THE CRITICAL ASSESSMENT AND INITIAL US AGENCY VIEWS ON CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN'S OCTOBER 1975 PROPOSALS FOR MAJOR US-USSR COOPERATIVE PROJECTS.

INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY

2. WE BELIEVE WE ARE MAKING SATISFACTORY PROGRESS TOWARDS OUR POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES UNDER THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS. SINCE 1972, THERE HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENT-
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ED EXPANSION OF CONTACT BETWEEN CABINET-LEVEL, SUB-CABINET

LEVEL OFFICERS AND SPECIALISTS WITH EQUIVALENT-LEVEL SOVIET OFFICIALS. AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS HAVE VISITED FACILITIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN CLOSED AREAS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS, BUT HAVE BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO OTHERS. WE HAVE GAINED ACCESS TO A WIDER RANGE OF MINISTRIES, STATE COMMITTEES AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES THAN EVER BEFORE, ENGAGING SOVIET ADMINISTRATORS AND SPECIALISTS IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS, THEREBY ADDING TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A CLOSED SOCIETY.

3. WE HAVE ALSO ACHIEVED MODEST, BUT IN SOME INSTANCES SIGNIFICANT, CONCRETE TECHNICAL/SCIENTIFIC BENEFITS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TEST A US-DESIGNED PIECE OF EQUIPMENT IN A SOVIET MAGNETOHYDRODYNAMIC TEST FACILITY, ACHIEVING GOOD RESULTS ON THE QUALITIES OF OUR EQUIPMENT. WE ARE OBTAINING FROM THE SOVIETS A HIGH-NITROGEN-CONTENT STEEL INGOT, OF A TYPE WE DO NOT PRODUCE, FOR TESTING. WE ARE TESTING SOVIET CONCRETE RAILROAD TIES AND THEY ARE TESTING A US RAILROAD CAR COUPLING DEVICE. THEY ARE CONTRIBUTING DOLS 1,000,000 ANNUALLY TO OUR DEEP SEA DRILLING PROJECT. SOVIET PHOTOGRAPHS OF MARS ARE USEFUL TO NASA IN SELECTING ALTERNATIVE LANDING SITES FOR OUR MARINER SATELLITE. WE HAVE TESTED, WITH GOOD RESULTS, SOVIET ANTI-CANCER DRUGS, AND HAVE LEARNED THEY ARE FAR AHEAD OF US IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARTIFICIAL HEART. THERE HAS IN FACT BEEN LITTLE ACTUAL EXCHANGE OF TECHNOLOGY; EXPORT CONTROL ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS ARE BEING OBSERVED.

4. WE BELIEVE WE ARE ALSO GAINING USEFUL SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION, THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF WHICH APPEARS TO BE IMPROVING. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION IS UNEVEN, AND WE CONTINUE TO PROD THE SOVIETS TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO OUR REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO PROVIDE DATA ON FORWARD ESTIMATES ON PRODUCTION AND TRADE OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, STIPULATED IN THE AGREEMENT; THEY ARE, HOWEVER, PROVIDING RECENT HISTORICAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION INFORMATION WHICH HELPS US BUILD A BETTER DATA BASE ON SOVIET AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. WE HAVE OBTAINED EXTENSIVE SPACE BIOLOGY DATA, USEFUL INSIGHTS INTO SOVIET CONTROLLED THERMO-
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NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAMS, METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES IN MEDICINE, AND HAVE SUCCESSFULLY USED SOVIET EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION METHODS IN THE UNITED STATES.

5. LITTLE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY HAS DEVELOPED FROM ACTIVITIES UNDER THESE AGREEMENTS, BUT THIS WAS NOT ONE OF OUR MAJOR OBJECTIVES. THE BIGGEST DISAPPOINTMENT TO DATE WAS THE SOVIET DECISION NOT TO PURCHASE US-MANUFACTURED AIR

TRAFFIC CONTROL EQUIPMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY HAVE SOUGHT AND ARE SEEKING TO PURCHASE COMPUTERS IN CONNECTION WITH PROGRAMS UNDER THE OCEANOGRAPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; THESE APPLICATIONS ARE CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW.

6. OUR ASSESSMENT OF BALANCE OF TECHNICAL BENEFITS AT THE PRESENT TIME FOR THE VARIOUS AGREEMENTS IS AS FOLLOWS: FOR THE 1972 AGREEMENTS, THE SOVIETS ARE GAINING MORE THAN WE ARE IN ENVIRONMENT AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; WE ARE PROBABLY ABOUT EVEN IN THE SPACE AGREEMENT; AND THE HEALTH AGREEMENT IS ROUGHLY BALANCED. FOR THE 1973 AGREEMENTS, THERE IS AN IMBALANCE IN THE SOVIET FAVOR IN THE AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS REFUSE TO PROVIDE THE FORWARD ESTIMATES WE DESIRE; LITTLE CONCRETE HAS YET COME OUT OF THE OCEANS AND TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENTS; AND THERE IS MIXED SUCCESS IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF SOVIET OBSTACLES IN THE FAST BREEDER REACTOR PROGRAM. OF THE 1974 AGREEMENTS, WE ARE GAINING UNDER THE MAGNETOHYDRODYNAMIC PROJECT OF THE ENERGY AGREEMENT, BUT THE REST OF THIS AGREEMENT IS AT A STANDSTILL. THE HOUSING/OTHER CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT IS NOW ENTERING AN ACTIVE STAGE.

7. IN SUMMARY, WHILE WE HAVE ACHIEVED SOME CONCRETE BENEFITS TO DATE, SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS ARE STILL SOME TIME OFF, AND WE MUST EXERCISE CARE THAT BENEFITS WILL BE RECIPROCAL. OUR INITIAL POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES WERE SPELLED OUT IN GENERAL TERMS, IN PART BECAUSE WE REALIZED MUCH EXPLORATORY WORK WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DEFINE PROJECTS OF GENUINELY MUTUAL INTERESTS.

8. WE KNEW ALSO WE WERE DEALING WITH A VAST, CUMBERSOME BUREAUCRACY, ACCUSTOMED TO SECRECY AND SUSPICION, AND THAT CONFIDENTIAL

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TIME, TRIAL AND ERROR WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE WE COULD BE CERTAIN THAT COOPERATION WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. PROGRESS IS BEING MADE. BUT THE EXTENT, DEPTH, AND DURABILITY OF OUR SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL COOPERATION REMAIN UNEVEN, AND CONTINUE TO DEPEND ON POLITICAL FACTORS OUTSIDE THE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK WE HAVE ESTABLISHED. THE INITIAL PERIOD OF VALIDITY OF THE 1972 AGREEMENTS ENDS IN MAY 1977, AND DECISIONS CONCERNING THEIR RENEWAL SHOULD BE MADE BY THE END OF 1976.

OBJECTIVES:

9. IN IMPLEMENTING THESE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, WE AND THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE SIMILAR OBJECTIVES. DIFFERENT PRIORITIES FOR THESE OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT KEPT COOPERATION

FROM DEVELOPING MOMENTUM.

10. UNITED STATES: OUR PRIMARY POLITICAL OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, CREATING AN INTERLOCKING FRAMEWORK OF OBLIGATIONS AND INCENTIVES WHICH COULD FOSTER RESTRAINT IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR. WE HOPE THAT IN THE SOVIET UNION NEW INCENTIVES CAN BE CULTIVATED AND BROUGHT TO BEAR ON DECISION MAKERS, ENCOURAGING THEM TO ACT ALONG LINES CONSONANT WITH OUR INTERESTS. WE HAVE PURSUED THIS OBJECTIVE THROUGH THE MECHANISMS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE STRUCTURES AND THROUGH THE FORMS OF JOINT COOPERATIVE WORK PROJECTS AND LONG-TERM RESEARCH.

11. TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE, WE HAVE SOUGHT, AND SEEK, TO GAIN ACCESS TO BROAD, INFLUENTIAL AREAS OF THE SOVIET BUREAUCRATIC AND SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENT, TO GAIN ACCESS TO IMPORTANT RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS IN CLOSED AREAS WHERE THIS IS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS. IN GENERAL WE ALSO WANT TO STIMULATE A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ON PROFESSIONAL, SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, AS WELL AS TO ENABLE KEY OFFICIALS AND SPECIALISTS ON BOTH SIDES TO GAIN A BETTER, MORE ACCURATE APPRECIATION OF EACH OTHER'S SOCIETIES.

12. OUR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO
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BUILD, ON THE BASIS OF THE ESSENTIALLY POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AGREEMENTS, TECHNICALLY SOUND PROGRAMS OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION. WE HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT US TECHNOLOGY IS GENERALLY MORE ADVANCED THAN SOVIET TECHNOLOGY, BUT WE HAVE SOUGHT TO SELECT AND CAREFULLY DEFINE TOPICS FOR COOPERATION WITH GOOD POTENTIAL FOR BALANCED BENEFITS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE STRESSED TO US EXECUTIVE AGENCIES AND PARTICIPANTS THAT COOPERATION MUST RESULT IN TECHNICAL BENEFIT TO THE US IF THIS ASPECT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW IS TO HAVE PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT. FOREIGN POLICY GAINS, HOWEVER DEFINED, SHOULD NOT BE A CRITERION FOR AGREEING TO TECHNICAL PROJECTS. THUS FAR, MUCH OF THE ACTIVITY UNDER THE AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD DEFINING PROJECTS IN WHICH BOTH SIDES COULD OBTAIN MUTUAL BENEFITS. AS THE PROCESS CONTINUES, HOWEVER, WE WOULD EXPECT THERE TO BE AN INCREASED FLOW OF TECHNICAL BENEFITS TO THE AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY.

13. OUR COMMERCIAL/ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN SUBSIDIARY TO OUR POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES. IN MOST INSTANCES, THE PROJECTS SELECTED FOR JOINT WORK ARE OF A RESEARCH RATHER THAN PRODUCTION-ORIENTED NATURE. WHEREVER

APPROPRIATE, HOWEVER, WE HAVE SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR. OUR INTENTION IN DOING SO IS TO PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CONTACT THAT COULD LATER BE FOLLOWED UP INDEPENDENTLY BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

14. SOVIET UNION: THE PRINCIPAL SOVIET OBJECTIVE APPEARS TO BE TO DEVELOP TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN AREAS THAT WILL FACILITATE DEVELOPMENT OF APPLIED TECHNOLOGY AND THE SOLVING OF PRODUCTION PROBLEMS. THEY ALSO WANT TO INCREASE THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF US BASIC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES, AS THIS CAN GIVE THEM LONGER LEAD TIME ON NEW US CAPABILITIES. TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE, THEY HAVE SOUGHT ACCESS TO THE WIDEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF US FACILITIES, GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE. IN THE PROCESS, THEY MAY BE SEEKING NOT ONLY TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND MANAGERIAL KNOW-HOW, BUT ALSO TO DETERMINE WHAT KINDS OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY THEY MAY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN.

15. THEIR POLITICAL OBJECTIVE APPEARS TO BE TWO-FOLD. FIRST, CONFIDENTIAL

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THEY WISH TO STIMULATE THE IDEA THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET, THAT WE HAVE MUCH TO GAIN BY TREATING THEM AS AN EQUAL, AND THAT THEY HAVE NO ULTERIOR MOTIVES. SECOND, THEY WISH TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY ARE OUR TECHNOLOGICAL EQUAL, AND THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE FROM STRENGTH, NOT WEAKNESS. THEY HOPE, THEREBY, THAT THIS WILL BOLSTER THEIR IMAGE IN THE EYES OF OTHERS AS A TECHNICAL/SCIENTIFIC AS WELL AS MILITARY SUPERPOWER.

BALANCE OF BENEFITS:

16. IN ATTEMPTING TO ASSESS THE CONCRETE BENEFITS WE HAVE RECEIVED TO DATE, WE HAVE USED THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA, WHICH ARE, HOWEVER, LARGELY SUBJECTIVE. OUR POLITICAL BENEFITS, EXPRESSED IN GENERAL TERMS, ARE NOT EASILY QUANTIFIABLE AND CANNOT BE JUDGED ON A SHORT-TERM BASIS. THEY WOULD INCLUDE: THE CREATION OF AN INTERLOCKING NETWORK OF OBLIGATIONS AND INCENTIVES WHICH--IN THE LONG TERM --COULD FOSTER RESTRAINT IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR; EASY ACCESS TO IMPORTANT SOVIET SCIENTIFIC/MANAGERIAL OFFICIALS AND ESTABLISHMENTS; RELAXATION IN THE SOVIET PRACTICE OF CLOSING CITIES, REGIONS, AND SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONS TO ACCESS BY FOREIGNERS; AN INCREASED FLOW OF USEFUL INFORMATION BETWEEN SPECIALISTS WITHOUT A POLITICAL FILTER; AN EASIER AND MORE NORMAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN SCIENTISTS ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS.

17. THE TECHNICAL BENEFITS WE COULD DERIVE FROM COOPERATION INCLUDE: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOLUTION OF COMMON

PROBLEMS; INSIGHTS INTO AN APPROACH TO A PROBLEM WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD SOONER BY WORKING INDEPENDENTLY; DATA AND INFORMATION OF USE TO US; OR MONETARY SAVINGS FROM SHARING IN THE WORK OF A PROJECT WITH THE SOVIETS.

18. SINCE MANY OF THE AGREEMENTS HAVE ONLY RECENTLY LEFT THE EXPLORATORY STAGE, WE DO NOT YET KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO RELATE THEM TO OUR OWN DOMESTIC PRIORITIES. THUS WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE SO FAR TO ASSIGN PRIORITIES FOR PROJECTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO US. WE ARE, IN SHORT, STILL UNCLEAR IN MANY AREAS ABOUT EXACTLY WHAT BENEFITS WE CAN EXPECT TO GET, BUT AS OUR KNOWLEDGE
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OF SOVIET STRENGTHS IMPROVES AS A RESULT OF THE COOPERATIVE ACTIVITY UNDER THE AGREEMENTS, WE INTEND TO ESTABLISH PRIORITIES AND TO FOCUS OUR OWN EFFORTS TOWARDS THOSE AREAS WHERE WE CAN BENEFIT THE MOST. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THIS APPROACH IS THE BEST AFTER HAVING ATTEMPTED WITHOUT SUCCESS TO ESTABLISH PRIORITIES FOR S & T PROJECTS BEFORE COOPERATION WAS SUFFICIENTLY ADVANCED TO MAKE SUCH DECISIONS. AS A RESULT, WITHOUT AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRIORITIES OF BOTH SIDES, IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE, EITHER WITHIN AN AGREEMENT OR ACROSS AGREEMENTS. TO MEASURE RELATIVE BENEFITS FROM COOPERATION IN PARTICULAR PROJECTS.

19. IT IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE IN THE SHORT TERM PROGRESS TOWARDS MEETING OUR MAIN POLITICAL OBJECTIVES UNDER THE AGREEMENTS, AND THE INTANGIBLE BENEFITS THAT MAY RESULT.

HOWEVER, WE HAVE GAINED ACCESS TO SIGNIFICANT LEVELS OF THE SOVIET SCIENTIFIC/GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY. THREE OF THE SOVIET CO-CHAIRMEN OF JOINT COMMITTEES ARE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT BODY AFTER THE POLITBURO; OTHER SOVIET CO-CHAIRMEN OCCUPY POLICY-LEVEL POSITIONS IN THEIR MINISTRIES. ALTHOUGH DIFFERENCES AND DIFFICULTIES EXIST, DIALOGUE HAS BECOME EASIER AND MORE CONSTRUCTIVE. THERE ALSO SEEMS TO BE DEVELOPING A GREATER APPRECIATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S OUTLOOKS. SIMILARLY, AS SPECIALISTS MEET AND GET OVER THE INITIAL "FEELING OUT" STAGES, PROFESSIONAL DIALOGUE IS BECOMING MORE PRODUCTIVE. HOWEVER, WHETHER WE ARE INDUCING MODERATION AND RESTRAINT IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR SEEMS UNLIKELY, AT THIS STAGE.

20. WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS ON ACCESS TO IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS AND CLOSED ZONES AND ON DATA EX-

CHANGE, BUT THE PICTURE IS A MIXED ONE. AMERICAN SPECIALISTS HAVE VISITED SOME CLOSED CITIES IN CONNECTION WITH COOPERATIVE PROJECTS, BUT WE HAVE BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO SOME FACILITIES. IN GENERAL, PROJECTS INVOLVING COLD-WEATHER WORK HAVE GONE SLOWLY, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIET SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. UNDER AT LEAST TWO AGREEMENTS--HEALTH AND AGRICULTURE--THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A DISINCLINATION TO REQUEST VISITS TO RELEVANT SITES IN CLOSEAREAS--BECAUSE THIS MIGHT DISTURB THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE AGREEMENTS. APART FROM THE CONTINUING SOVIET FAILURE TO PROVIDE DATA ON TRADE IN MAJOR AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, THERE HAS BEEN AN IMPROVEMENT IN DATA AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE UNDER THE AGREEMENTS. IN LARGE PART THIS HAS BEEN DUE TO US UNWILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO SUPPLY DATA TO THE SOVIETS WITHOUT RECIPROCAL ACTION. WE ARE, IN EFFECT, LEARNING THE HARD WAY.

21. PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING OUR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL OBJECTIVE TO OBTAIN TECHNICAL BENEFITS VARIES GREATLY FROM AGREEMENT TO AGREEMENT AND FROM PROJECT TO PROJECT. ALTHOUGH IN MOST CASES BENEFITS TO EACH SIDE HAVE BEEN ONLY MODEST, WE BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO GENERALIZE THAT ON THE WHOLE EACH SIDE HAS BENEFITED ABOUT EQUALLY.

22. ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO US HAVE BEEN MODEST TO DATE, AND SINCE IT IS TOO SOON TO SEE WHAT ECONOMIC BENEFITS THE SOVIETS CAN ACTUALLY REAP FROM THEIR IMPROVED EXPOSURE TO OUR TECHNOLOGY, WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE TO DRAW A BALANCE OF ECONOMIC BENEFITS AT THIS TIME.

23. THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF A BASIS BEING DEVELOPED FOR FUTURE SUBSTANTIAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT BENEFITS TO BOTH SIDES. BUT THERE ARE NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIES, OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AS WELL AS SUBSTANTIVE NATURE, SO WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO EXAGGERATE THE NEAR TERM POTENTIAL. AT THE SAME TIME, AS WE MOVE AWAY FROM THE INITIAL EXPLORATORY PHASE AND INTO ACTUAL JOINT WORK, WE BELIEVE IT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO MONITOR CLOSELY THE BALANCE OF BENEFITS FROM THE AGREEMENTS.

24. FOR EACH AGREEMENT WE ASSESS THE CURRENT BALANCE OF TECHNICAL BENEFITS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1972): THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL PROJECTS IN ALL TWELVE AREAS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT EXCEPT
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PHYSICS. MODEST TECHNICAL BENEFITS BEING RECEIVED BY EACH SIDE ARE ROUGHLY IN BALANCE. NONETHELESS, IN SOME AREAS, SUCH AS PHYSICS, STANDARDIZATION, FORESTRY, AND MICROBIOLOGY, IT MAY DEVELOP THAT THE PROBABLE TECHNICAL RESULTS TO US ARE NOT WORTH THE CONSIDERABLE EFFORT BEING EXPENDED. IN OTHER AREAS, WE EXPECT TO GAIN FROM SOVIET ADVANCES IN ELECTROMETALLURGY, AND THEY ARE CURRENTLY LEARNING ABOUT ADVANCED AMERICAN MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN THE APPLICATIONS OF COMPUTERS AREA.

(B) ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1972): THE SOVIETS SO FAR HAVE PROBABLY GAINED MORE TECHNICAL BENEFITS IN MANY OF THE ELEVEN PROJECT AREAS THAN WE HAVE, PARTLY BECAUSE OF OUR INITIAL FORTHCOMINGNESS. IN SOME PROJECTS, WATER POLLUTION, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BALANCE IS ABOUT EQUAL, AND IN OTHERS, SUCH AS EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION, THE BALANCE SEEMS PRESENTLY TO BE IN OUR FAVOR. WE MIGHT ALSO GAIN FROM SEEING HOW THE SOVIETS APPROACH PROBLEMS AT A LOWER LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY. SOVIET GAINS IN THIS AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, CAN BE IN OUR LONG-TERM INTEREST TO THE EXTENT IT RESULTS IN IMPROVED SOVIET ECOLOGICAL PRACTICES.

(C) PUBLIC HEALTH (1972): WE ARE PRESENTLY BENEFITING FROM A BROADENED DATA BASE, AND FROM SAVINGS IN FUNDS AND MANPOWER DEVOTED TO CLINICAL INVESTIGATIONS. HOWEVER, THE NATURE OF JOINT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH IS LONG-RANGE AND WILL PRODUCE INFORMATION FULLY AVAILABLE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE HEALTH OF THE POPULATION OF BOTH SIDES. THUS, IN THIS SENSE, EACH SIDE WILL BENEFIT EQUALLY. WE WERE INITIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL IMBALANCE RESULTING FROM POOR METHODOLOGY AND MORE LIMITED ACCESS TO TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ARE NOW GAINING METHODOLOGICAL PARITY WITH US RESEARCHERS, AN IMPROVEMENT PERHAPS STIMULATED BY THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN COOPERATION WITH THE US. FOR EXAMPLE, A US-SOVIET TELEX FOR DOCTORS PERFORMING OPEN HEART SURGERY NOW PERMITS REAL-TIME CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN SPECIALISTS IN THE CARDIOVASCULAR AREA.

(D) SPACE (1972): AT THIS STAGE BOTH WE AND THE SOVIETS ARE BENEFITING FROM SPACE COOPERATION TO SUBSTANTIAL

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TIALLY THE SAME EXTENT. SPECIFIC US BENEFITS INCLUDE REDUCED COSTS IN DEVELOPING AND TESTING AN APOLLO-SOYUZ FOLLOW-ON DOCKING SYSTEM, SIMPLIFIED LAUNCHING TECHNIQUES,

LUNAR SAMPLES FROM AREAS NOT VISITED BY APOLLO CREWS, MARS AND VENUS PHOTOGRAPHY, AUTOPSY REPORTS ON THREE SOVIET COSMONAUTS AFTER ONE OF THE LONGEST MANNED SPACE FLIGHTS, USE OF SOVIET COSMOS 782 LAUNCH FOR US BIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS, AND SOVIET DATA FROM METEOROLOGICAL ROCKET SOUNDINGS.

SOVIET BENEFITS INCLUDE LUNAR SAMPLES FROM APOLLO MISSIONS AND US ADVANCES IN SPACE MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY. MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, WHICH THE SOVIETS HOPED WOULD GIVE THEM AN APPEARANCE OF PARITY, STUDY OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, AND SPACE BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE ARE THE MAIN AREAS WHERE COOPERATION IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. RECENTLY, THOUGH, WE HAVE NOTED A GENERAL SOVIET SLOWDOWN SINCE APOLLO-SOYUZ ON POSSIBLE MANNED SPACE COOPERATION, PERHAPS BECAUSE THE SOVIETS ARE RECONSIDERING THEIR PRIORITIES.

(E) TRANSPORTATION (1973): THE VERY MODEST TECHNICAL BENEFITS SO FAR HAVE BEEN BALANCED OR FAVORABLE TO THE USSR. CURRENT TECHNICAL BENEFITS TO THE US HAVE BEEN LIMITED LARGELY TO INFORMATION ABOUT SOVIET APPROACHES TO VARIOUS TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS SUCH AS RAILROAD MAINTENANCE, WHERE WE HAVE RECEIVED TEN CONCRETE RAILROAD TIES FOR TESTING. COOPERATION IN ICE TRANSITING TECHNOLOGY, WHICH IS OF HIGH PRIORITY INTEREST TO US, MAY RESULT IN BENEFIT TO US AT A LATER STAGE.

THE SOVIETS HAVE RECEIVED FOR TESTING AN AUTOMATIC RAILROAD COUPLING DEVICE FROM US BUT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR THAT IT WILL BE OF USE TO THEM. WE ANTICIPATE THAT CONTINUED COOPERATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL LEAD TO LOWER TRANSPORTATION CONSTRUCTION COSTS, TO IMPROVED RAILROAD MAINTENANCE, AND TO SOVIET SUPPORT FOR USING US EQUIPMENT TO STANDARDIZE A WORLDWIDE MICROWAVE LANDING SYSTEM AND, POSSIBLY, A MERCHANT MARINE SELECTIVE CALLING SYSTEM.

(F) WORLD OCEANS (1973): COOPERATION IN SOME AREAS OF
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THIS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN SLOW TO GET ORGANIZED AND UNDERWAY, PARTLY BECAUSE OF UNCLEAR LINES OF RESPONSIBILITY ON THE SOVIET SIDE. UNDER THE OCEAN CURRENTS AND DYNAMICS AND THE GEOLOGY, GEOPHYSICS AND GEOCHEMISTRY AREAS, THE MODEST TECHNICAL BENEFITS OBTAINED SO FAR HAVE BEEN FLOWING MORE TO THE US, WITH SLIGHT GAINS FOR THE SOVIETS. IN OTHER AREAS, IT IS STILL TOO SOON TO ASSESS RELATIVE BENEFITS. MAJOR BENEFITS FROM COOPERATION ARE EXPECTED TO BE REALIZED ONLY IN THE LATER STAGES OF THE AGREEMENT'S TERM, E.G., IN 1977-78, BECAUSE OF THE NECESSITY FOR EXTENSIVE

AND DETAILED PLANNING OF FIELD INVESTIGATIONS INHERENT IN THE AGREEMENT.

(G) ATOMIC ENERGY (1973): THE BALANCE OF TECHNICAL BENEFITS HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT MIXED, WITH THE SOVIETS SO FAR GAINING ONLY SLIGHTLY MORE THAN THE US. THE SOVIETS HAVE PROBABLY GAINED MORE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES OF MATTER AREA BECAUSE OF ACCESS TO OUR FERMILAB ACCELERATOR; BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE BROUGHT USEFUL EQUIPMENT AND EXPERIENCE TO THIS LAB. IN THE CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR FUSION AREA, THE BALANCE HAS SWUNG FROM SOMEWHAT IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIETS A YEAR AGO TO APPROXIMATE EQUALITY OF BENEFITS NOW, PARTICULARLY AS WE LEARN MORE ABOUT SOVIET APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING PLASMA FLOW. THE BALANCE IN FAST BREEDER REACTORS APPEARS SLIGHTLY IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH RESULTS HAVE BEEN MODEST BECAUSE OF SOVIET RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS AND BECAUSE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR SUBSTANTIVE COOPERATION HAVE ONLY RECENTLY BEEN ASCERTAINED.

(H) AGRICULTURE (1973): USDA BELIEVES THERE IS SOME IMBALANCE IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIETS, RESULTING IN PART FROM OUR FORTHCOMING RESPONSES TO SOVIET INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, AND FROM SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY DATA ON FORWARD ESTIMATES OF COMMODITY PRODUCTION, UTILIZATION, AND TRADE. COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY FIELD HAVE NOT YET PROGRESSED ENOUGH TO MAKE THE IMBALANCE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US, BUT WE WANT TO TAKE STEPS TO BRING ABOUT A BETTER BALANCE AND TO GAIN RELATIVELY MORE TECHNICAL BENEFITS IN THE FUTURE. SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO CUT BACK ON COOPERATION IN THE AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES AND AGRIBUSINESS
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PROJECTS, FROM WHICH THE SOVIETS GAIN MOST, UNTIL THE SOVIETS ARE MORE FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING FORWARD ESTIMATES.

(I) ENERGY (1974): IT IS PREMATURE TO DRAW A BALANCE SHEET ON TECHNICAL BENEFITS RECEIVED, EXCEPT IN MAGNETO-HYDRODYNAMICS (MHD), WHERE JOINT WORK TO DATE HAS BENEFITED BOTH SIDES ABOUT EQUALLY. ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFICULTIES ON BOTH SIDES HAVE IMPEDED MORE RAPID MOVEMENT IN OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION; AND UNTIL SPECIFIC PROJECTS ARE BETTER DEFINED, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT MHD WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE PRINCIPAL PROJECT GENERATING CONCRETE TECHNICAL BENEFITS.

(J) HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION (1974): WHILE IT IS ALSO TOO EARLY TO JUDGE THE BALANCE OF BENEFITS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE SOV-

IETS COULD GAIN IN SOME AREAS, AND WE IN OTHERS. THE ONLY AREAS WHERE MEETINGS HAVE OCCURRED SO FAR ARE CONSTRUCTION IN EXTREME CLIMATES AND SEISMIC AREAS, AND IN NEW TOWNS. AT THIS STAGE WE BELIEVE WE WILL BENEFIT MOST FROM THE EXTREME CLIMATES/SEISMIC AREAS PROJECTS.

IMPLEMENTATION

25. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN AND IS A PRAGMATIC PROCESS, AS OFFICIALS AND SPECIALISTS HAVE SOUGHT TO DEFINE AND ESTABLISH THE TECHNICAL/SCIENTIFIC AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATIVE WORK. THE PROCESS HAS BEEN A COMPLICATED ONE, INVOLVING IN MANY INSTANCES PERSONS--BOTH WITHIN GOVERNMENT AND IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR--WHO WERE INITIALLY UNFAMILIAR WITH THE STATE OR LEVEL OF SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POLITICAL/BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE THERE. SINCE BOTH THE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR SUCH COOPERATION WERE STATED IN GENERAL TERMS, IT WAS NOT TO BE EXPECTED THEREFORE THAT PRECISE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL GOALS COULD BE ESTABLISHED AT THE OUTSET, WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE EXPLORATORY WORK.

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26. JOINT WORK: OF THE () PROJECTS IDENTIFIED FOR JOINT WORK UNDER THE ELEVEN AGREEMENTS, () PROJECTS ARE ACTUALLY IN THAT STAGE. JOINT WORK MAY CONSIST OF EXCHANGES OF SCIENTISTS/SPECIALISTS WORKING IN EACH OTHER'S LABORATORIES OR SHIPS, INDEPENDENT WORK ON A MUTUALLY-AGREED PROBLEM AND COMPARISON OF RESULTS, THE TESTING AND USE OF COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT, OR JOINT SEMINARS AND THE PUBLICATION OF JOINT PAPERS. OTHER PROJECTS ARE CLOSE TO MOVING TO THE STAGE OF JOINT WORK. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DISCERN ANY CLEAR PATTERN WHY SOME PROJECTS HAVE MOVED MORE QUICKLY THAN OTHERS TO JOINT WORK, BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF EASILY IDENTIFIABLE PRIORITY PROJECTS, COMPLEMENTARITY OF LEVELS OF RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT MAY PROVIDE SOME OF THE ANSWER. ENERGETIC, EFFICIENT PROJECT LEADERS WOULD APPEAR TO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR. AT THE SAME TIME, SLOW PROGRESS IN COLD WEATHER AREAS AND SOME DATA EXCHANGE PROJECTS, SUCH AS FORWARD ESTIMATES ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND IN SCIENCE POLICY, PROBABLY REFLECT SOVIET SECURITY SENSITIVITIES.

27. SOVIET BUREAUCRACY: THE EXPERIENCE WE HAVE GAINED HAS BROUGHT HOME TO US THE DIFFICULTIES IN OPERATING THROUGH THE VAST, PONDEROUS, OVER-CENTRALIZED SOVIET BUREAUCRACY. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOTED A DIFFERENCE IN THE WAY THE SOVIET

BUREAUCRACY HANDLES SCIENCE PROJECTS AND TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS. THE FORMER, WHERE SCIENTISTS HAVE A NATURAL TENDENCY TO BE FREEWHEELING AND INDEPENDENT, APPEAR TO GET STARTED QUICKLY. BUT THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES HAS PLAYED A MAJOR BRAKING ROLE, PERHAPS TO INSURE THAT SOVIET EMPHASIS ON THEORY CAPITALIZES ADEQUATELY ON US STRENGTHS IN INSTRUMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION. IN CONTRAST, TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS, RUN MOSTLY UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, HAVE BEEN SLOW TO GET GOING.

28. THE OVERLY-CENTRALIZED SOVIET BUREAUCRACY HAS CAUSED COORDINATION PROBLEMS UNDER VARIOUS PROJECTS. SOME OF THIS MAY BE GENUINE; BUT IN OTHER INSTANCES, SUCH AS UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT, IT APPEARS TO BE A CONVENIENT SOVIET DEVICE TO REFRAIN FROM DOING SOMETHING THAT IS NOT IN ITS INTEREST. AND, WHILE VIRTUALLY ALL US EXECUTIVE

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AGENCIES STATE THEY ARE LEARNING TO COPE WITH THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY, THERE IS NEED ON OUR SIDE FOR A MUCH MORE SYSTEMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, VIEWS, AND EXPERIENCE ON HOW TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE BUREAUCRACY.

29. ACCESS: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, GENERALLY IN THE FORM OF TRAVEL CONTROLS, HAVE BEEN OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED ACCESS FOR US, SINCE EXTENSIVE SOVIET CLOSED AREAS ARE MUCH MORE OF AN OBSTACLE TO US THAN OUR SELECTED INSTALLATION RESTRICTIONS ARE TO THE SOVIETS. HOWEVER, IN GENERAL WE PERCEIVE A GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR ACCESS TO SOVIET INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS. WE HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO GAIN ACCESS TO NEW REGIONS OF THE USSR, SUCH AS EASTERN SIBERIA, SAKHALIN, MAGADEN, THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AREA IN CENTRAL ASIA, AND KAMCHATKA. BOTH SIDES REMAIN RELUCTANT TO SHOW FACILITIES WHEN THERE ARE NEW PROCESSES NOT YET PROTECTED BY PATENTS. US FIRMS ARE RELUCTANT TO REVEAL PROPRIETARY INFORMATION, AND CAREFUL OBSERVATION OF EXPORT CONTROL ADMINISTRATION PROVISIONS HAS PRECLUDED UNAUTHORIZED EXPORT OF DATA OR TECHNOLOGY. THE QUALITY OF SOVIET PARTICIPANTS HAS BEEN GENERALLY GOOD; AT THE SAME TIME, IN A FEW INSTANCES, IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT FOR POLITICAL REASONS SOME SOVIET SCIENTISTS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO TRAVEL TO THE US FOR AGREEMENT-RELATED WORK.

30. PRIVATE SECTOR: THE US PRIVATE SECTOR HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THE AGREEMENTS FROM THE BEGINNING THROUGH MEMBERSHIP ON JOINT COMMITTEES, WORKING AND PROJECT GROUPS, THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN US DELEGATIONS, AND BY HOSTING VISITING SOVIET DELEGATIONS. FURTHERMORE, UNDER ARTICLE IV PROVISIONS OF THE S AND T AGREEMENT, AND SIMILAR

ARTICLES IN THE OTHER AGREEMENTS, NEARLY FIFTY US COMPANIES HAVE SIGNED THEIR OWN COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS. THESE ARTICLES REFLECT OUR POLICY OF ENCOURAGING COMMERCIALLY ATTRACTIVE TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING NON-STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY; WHEN A GIVEN AREA OF TECHNOLOGY IS OF PRIVATE INTEREST, IT IS DEEMPHASIZED IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM. SO FAR, NOT MUCH TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED UNDER THE PRIVATE AGREEMENTS, WHICH ARE STATEMENTS OF INTENT RATHER THAN OBLIGATIONS, AND THERE HAVE BEEN FEW EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS. THIS CONTRASTS WITH
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THE FACT THAT US FIRMS HAVE CONCLUDED SOME TWENTY-ONE AGREEMENTS TO PURCHASE SOVIET TECHNOLOGY OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST TO US IN FIELDS OF METALLURGY, MINING, MEDICINE, UNDERGROUND COAL GASIFICATION, OIL RECOVERY, AND PARTICLE ACCELERATORS.

31. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS: ON OUR SIDE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ENERGY AGREEMENT APPEARS TO BE SUFFERING FROM THE FACT THAT NO EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT HAS BEEN FORMALLY DESIGNATED. AS MATTERS NOW STAND, THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS PERFORMING THIS FUNCTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH FEA AND ERDA.

32. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN US AND SOVIET COUNTERPARTS HAVE OFTEN BEEN SLOW AND DIFFICULT, GENERALLY BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC REASONS AND PARTICULARLY WHERE SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTING AN AGREEMENT.

33. SCHEDULING OF VISITS AND DELEGATIONS HAS BEEN A PROBLEM TO BOTH SIDES, PARTLY DUE TO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES IN ARRANGING ITINERARIES. TO HELP OVERCOME THESE PROBLEMS, WE HAVE SOUGHT AND GENERALLY OBTAINED SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT ALL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE AGREED BY CUTOFF DATES WELL IN ADVANCE OF DEPARTURES.

34. FUNDING OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS HAS BEEN HANDLED IN PARTICIPATING AGENCY BUDGETS WITH NO SERIOUS PROBLEM YET THROUGH EXISTING LINE ITEMS FOR EITHER DOMESTIC WORK OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS. HOWEVER, THE GROWING COSTS INVOLVED ARE PUTTING INCREASING PRESSURE ON SOME AGENCY BUDGETS, AND SEVERAL MAY SEEK SPECIFIC LINE ITEMS FOR THEIR PROGRAMS. TRAVEL, REPRESENTATION, AND TRANSLATION COSTS ARE BECOMING A GENUINE PROBLEM UNDER SOME AGREEMENTS, AND COULD LEAD TO SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN CONDUCTING SUBSTANTIVE WORK. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE ASKED THE EXECUTIVE AGENCIES TO PROVIDE SPECIFICS OF THEIR FUNDING PROBLEMS, NONE HAS DONE SO. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE,

THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THEY MAY BE
HAVING FUNDING PROBLEMS IN MEETING THEIR COMMITMENTS.

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KOSYGIN PROPOSAL FOR MAJOR PROJECTS

35. KOSYGIN'S OCTOBER 1975 PROPOSAL TO DR. STEVER FOR
MAJOR JOINT PROJECTS CITED AS ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES AN
ELECTROMETALLURGY FACILITY, A HOSPITAL, A MODEL SEED FARM,
AND AN UNSPECIFIED TRANSPORTATION PROJECT. THESE WOULD
FALL UNDER THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, HEALTH, AGRICULTURE,
AND TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENTS, RESPECTIVELY. EXECUTIVE
AGENCIES HAVE CONSIDERED KOSYGIN'S PROPOSALS AND HAVE
REACHED THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS:

(A) ELECTROMETALLURGY: JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF FURNACES IN
THE ELECTROSLAG PROJECT OF THE S AND T AGREEMENT'S ELEC-
TROMETALLURGY AREA MIGHT BE A PROMISING ENDEAVOR, BUT THIS
WOULD DEPEND UPON THE EXTENT TO WHICH US PRIVATE INDUSTRY
WOULD WANT TO PARTICIPATE, AND THIS, IN TURN, CANNOT BE
ASCERTAINED UNTIL WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF SOVIET PERFORM-
ANCE IN ALREADY-AGREED ELECTROMETALLURGY JOINT PROJECTS.

(B) HOSPITAL: A JOINT HOSPITAL WOULD APPARENTLY BE OF
LITTLE INTEREST TO THE US BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT EXCESS OF
HOSPITAL BEDS HERE. IT MIGHT PROVE DESIRABLE, AS JOINT
WORK IN EXISTING HEALTH PROJECTS PROGRESSES, TO GIVE SOME
OF THEM A HIGHER PRIORITY: FOR EXAMPLE, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
AND CLINICAL ASPECTS OF CANCER AND HEART DISEASE.

(C) MODEL FARM: CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF A MODEL
FARM POSES US LEGAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, AND US CONTROL
COULD NOT BE EXERCISED TO A DEGREE WHICH WOULD INSURE
SUCCESS. HOWEVER, TENTATIVE PLANS FOR JOINT RESEARCH IN
WIND EROSION AND CROP PRODUCTION ON SEMI-ARID LANDS COULD
EVENTUALLY RESULT IN SUITABLE MODELS.

(D) TRANSPORTATION: WE ARE CURRENTLY EXPLORING, ON A
TENTATIVE AND PRELIMINARY BASIS, TWO IDEAS FOR POSSIBLE
MAJOR JOINT PROJECTS: ICE TRANSITING OPERATIONS AND THE
USE OF SATELLITES FOR MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS.

(E) OTHER POSSIBILITIES: MAJOR TOPICS IN AREAS NOT
RELATED TO KOSYGIN'S FOUR EXAMPLES MIGHT ALSO BE CON-
SIDERED. FOR INSTANCE, WITH ADDITIONAL FUNDING, EXISTING
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COOPERATION IN EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION UNDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT MIGHT BE GIVEN MORE EMPHASIS TO PUBLICIZE THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS ACTIVITY TO THE SAFETY AND LIVELIHOOD OF PEOPLE LIVING IN EARTHQUAKE-PRONE AREAS. IN THE SPACE AREA, JOINT OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE US SPACE SHUTTLE AND SOVIET SPACECRAFT MIGHT BE A SUITABLE FOLLOW-ON TO THE SUCCESSFUL APOLLO-SOYUZ PROGRAM. IN THE CONSTRUCTION AREA, AN ASTRODOME FOR THE 1980 MOSCOW OLYMPICS OR A JOINTLY PLANNED AND CONSTRUCTED NEW TOWN MIGHT BE EXPLORED. IN THE ENERGY AREA, AFTER FURTHER STUDY OF MAJOR TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL, AND POLITICAL ISSUES, WE MIGHT WISH TO PROPOSE JOINT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF COMMERCIAL MAGNETOHYDRODYNAMIC POWER STATIONS IN EACH COUNTRY.

36. IN SUM, WE MIGHT FIND IT DESIRABLE, AFTER FURTHER DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS OPTIONS, TO MAKE OUR OWN PROPOSALS FOR MAJOR PROJECTS. WHILE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN OUR DECISION SHOULD BE SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN PROMISING EXISTING JOINT PROJECTS, THE NATURE OF THE KIND OF PROJECT THE SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND, THE DEGREE OF POSSIBLE US GOVERNMENT/PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION, AND THE COSTS INVOLVED SUGGEST THAT THE STATE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD BE THE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

37. AS WE NOTED LAST QUARTER, THE THORNTON SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SEEING THE QUARTERLY REPORTS AND DR. STEVER'S TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT. COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS ARE AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS CRITICAL ASSESSMENT AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO REQUEST TO SEE IT ALSO.

END TEXT.

38. ENTIRE CRITICAL ASSESSMENT/QUARTERLY REPORT
POUCHED 3/4/76, REGISTRY NUMBER 569846. PLEASE PROVIDE
ANY COMMENTS BY MARCH 15. KISSINGER

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